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DEFENDING HUMANITY: WHEN FORCE IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY. By
George P Fletcher and Jens David Ohlin. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
20o8. Pp. 288. $27.95 (hardback).
Few issues are both more central to and more elusive for the project of.
international law than identifying the conditions under which the use of
armed force is justified. The U.N. Charter (in its English version) provides
a deceptively simple answer: states may deploy armed force only in self-
defense or when explicitly authorized by resolution of the U.N. Security
Council.' Yet as the controversies over preemptive war in Iraq and hu-
manitarian intervention in Kosovo, among other examples, reveal, vigorous
debate remains over both the acceptable boundaries of self-defense and the
availability of additional exceptions to the general ban on armed force.
Fletcher and Ohlin join this debate with the provocative claim that in-
ternational law has been impoverished by its neglect of the more developed
doctrines of self-defense existing in domestic criminal law. Borrowing a
phrase from the equally authoritative French version of the U.N. Charter,
the authors argue for a six-part model of "legitimate defense"2 that justifies
the defensive use of force against attacks that are (i) overt, (2) unlawful, and
(3) imminent; provided the defense is (4) necessary, (5) proportional, and
(6) knowing or intentional. The substance of the argument lies mainly in
the elaboration and application of this six-part framework. For example,
in opposition to the International Court of Justice's approach,3 the authors
maintain that states may deploy force in the legitimate defense of other
states regardless of whether the state under attack has consented either be-
fore or after the fact to such assistance. They further maintain that the right
of legitimate defense-and by extension the right to receive assistance from
third parties-accrues to "nations" in addition to states. Other chapters deal
with questions of justification and excuse, preemptive war, and the collective
dimension of war.
i. U.N. Charter, arts. 2(4), 41, 51.
2. The French version of Article 51 speaks of"lgitime defense" rather than self-defense,
a broader civil law concept that, according to the authors, embraces both the defense of
one's body, as well as the defense of others, and the defense of nonbodily interests such as
property and privacy (Fletcher & Ohlin 63-64). The authors also observe that the Spanish
and Russian texts (which, along with the Chinese, also have equal authority to the English)
parallel the French (64).
3. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14,
reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1023 (1986).
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This short review cannot attempt to do justice to every argument in
this thought-provoking book. The authors' approach is especially effec-
tive when it reveals how international law scholarship has either ignored
the lessons of criminal law principles or misread them to defend an overly
narrow doctrine of self-defense. Fascinating too is the authors' application
of the justification/excuse distinction to the United States' misinformed
Iraq intervention (127-28). Too often, however, the authors' argument is
weakened by confusion surrounding how best to analogize the "self" of
individual self-defense for the international context. Are we concerned here
with the defense of living, breathing human beings, more abstract notions
of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, or something else entirely?
To take only one example, the authors invoke the problem of justifying
the killing of a "psychotic aggressor" whose mental condition renders him
just as blameless as his threatened victim. 4 The authors posit an interna-
tional version of the hypothetical centered on justifying reparations for ag-
gression directed by a psychotic dictator who lacks democratic legitimacy.
The example is a trick, however, because it plays on both the literal psycho-
sis of a real human being-the dictator-and the metaphorical psychosis
of an abstract person-the state-that acts without democratic legitimacy.
Given the fundamental lack-of popular consent, the fact of the dictator's
personal medical diagnosis seems morally irrelevant to whether his people
should continue to suffer on his account, especially after, according to
the hypothetical, they have overthrown him. Yet the dictator's illegitimacy
raises deeper problems of international justice and state responsibility that
the psychotic aggressor analogy cannot hope to capture.
Also troublesome, and of greater significance, is the authors' approach
to the problem humanitarian intervention. What rights does international
law provide when a state attacks its own population rather than another
state? May the international community intervene to protect Albanians in
Kosovo or Kurds in Iraq? Yes, say the authors, subject to a troubling caveat:
the people under attack must be a "nation." Flether and Ohlin acknowledge
some of the many pitfalls inherent in defining, reifying, and privileging na-
tionhood as a discrete form of identity. They defend their view principally
4. This topic has been a previous focus of Fletcher's work. See George . Fletcher,
Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory,
8 Israel L. Rev. 367 (1973); George P. Fletcher, The Psychotic Aggressor-A Generation
Later, 27 Israel L. Rev. 227 (1992).
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because the U.N. Charter affirms the right of self-determination, and it
is the Charter upon which, in their view, "any theory of humanitarian
intervention must be focused" (t34). But this right is vaguely stated,5
perennially controversial, and not limited to nations,6 whereas the Charter
explicitly recognizes defense rights only' on behalf of "Member[s] of the
United Nations," who, of course, are states.7 Considering too the diffi-
culty of knowing when a "nation" has been attacked (as opposed to, say, a
large group of people who happen to be citizens of the same state), as well
as the dubious moral basis for focusing on nations in the first place, the
authors' already difficult Charter interpretation has insufficient payoff. A
more promising approach is one the authors explicitly reject-developing
a more inclusive theory of humanitarian intervention based on evolving
principles of human rights and international justice that are arguably more
central to the Charter's mission.8 This path too, is fraught with difficulty,9
but it better aspires to the promise of the book's title: that of defending
humanity, and not contested social constructs.
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt
Pace University School of Law
5. The Charter refers, in fact, to the "self-determination of peoples," and does so only
twice in contexts that have no obvious relation to the use of force. Article I states that a
purpose of the United Nations is "to develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." Article 55 reiterates this goal as a reason
to promote human rights, as well as various economic and social values.
6. In the colonial context, for example, the right of self-determination has been under-
stood to extend, collectively, to the "people" who live within particular colonial administra-
tive boundaries, regardless of whether they share other common bonds.
7. U.N. Charter, art. 5i.
8. Although this fact is hardly decisive, it is instructive to note that the Charter contains
seven references to human rights, compared with only two for self-determination.
9. The authors note, for example, that an argument of this nature cannot "fall within the
four corners of the U.N. Charter and its standards for the use of force" (134). That criticism,
however, also applies to the authors' approach.
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